Federalist No. 70 and the Single Executive

Hamilton's worry is simple: a group in charge can hide. If three people share executive power and something goes wrong, each can blame the other two, and voters can never pin down who actually failed. A single executive has nowhere to hide. Every decision traces back to one name, so that person has every incentive to act well and the public has a clear target for praise or blame. Hamilton calls this undivided responsibility, and he treats it as the core safety feature of putting power in one set of hands rather than splitting it up.

He backs this with four ingredients of energy in the executive: unity (one person, not a council), duration (a real term in office, long enough to act without constant fear of removal), adequate support (resources like pay and staff that keep the office independent), and competent powers (authority sufficient to actually do the job, like command of the military or the veto). Each buys a piece of effective action: unity buys speed and clear blame, duration buys courage to make unpopular calls, support buys independence from pressure, and real powers buys the ability to follow through.

A plural executive, Hamilton says, turns a crisis into a committee meeting. Disagreement among co-equals causes delay exactly when speed matters, and factions can form inside the executive itself, splitting it the way parties split a legislature. This sits next to Federalist No. 51's praise of checks and balances between branches. No. 70 is not against dividing power generally. It is only arguing about how to organize the inside of one branch, which is a different question from how branches should check each other.